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Introduction

In the opening brief, Husband demonstrated that the court of appeals
applied the wrong legal standard for determining when a change in
circumstances is a basis to modify alimony. Decades of case law articulates the
traditional test that a change in circumstances is a basis to modify alimony unless
the change was contemplated in the decree -i.e., the original alimony award
took into account the anticipated change in circumstances. MacDonald articulated
a new test that a change in circumstances is a basis to modify alimony unless the
change was foreseeable at the time of divorce - i.e., the original alimony award
could have, but need not have, taken into account the change in circumstance.
The traditional test requiring that the decree take into account the future
change has governed for decades, for good reason. A future change should be a
basis to modify alimony only if the change was factored into the original alimony
award. To use the language in the case law, a future change is a ground to
modify alimony if the change was "not contemplated in the decree itself." Bayles

v. Bayles, 1999 UT App 128, ,r 12, 981 P.2d 403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
MacDonald rejects the traditional test because the statute since 1995 uses
the word "foreseeable." Under MacDonald, a future change that could have been,
but was not, factored into the original alimony award is not a ground to modify
alimony. Under this standard, changes such as retirement or graduation no
longer provide a basis to modify alimony because those events are "foreseeable,"
i.e., capable of being taken into account, even if they were not.
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The logic of the traditional test perhaps explains why the Utah Legislature
has amended the statute numerous times without disapproving of the traditional
test's interpretation of "foreseeable." Regardless of the legislature's motive, its
choice to leave the traditional test unchanged governs here: "where a legislature
amends a portion of a statute but leaves other portions unamended, or re-enacts
them without change, the legislature is presumed to have been satisfied with
prior judicial constructions of the unchanged portions of the statute and to have
adopted them as consistent with its own intent." Christensen v. Indus. Comm'n,
642 P.2d 755,756 (Utah 1982). The court of appeals applied the wrong standard.

In the response brief, Wife defends the new standard on three grounds.
First, Wife asserts that MacDonald correctly overruled prior case law under the
test in Menzies. Second, Wife asserts that MacDonald is consistent with the prior
case law. Third, Wife asserts that MacDonald reflects the plain language of the
statute and the 1995 legislature's intent. Wife is incorrect on each point.
First, MacDonqld did not attempt to satisfy Menzies' standard fo,r
overturning precedent. Nor could it. The traditional test is workable, is not
clearly erroneous, and, most important, has been relied upon by thousands of
divorcing parties and district courts when drafting divorce decrees.
Second, MacDonald is inconsistent with decades of cases construing the
statute to reflect the traditional test. The traditional test concerns whether a
change is contemplated in the decree, whereas the MacDonald test concerns
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Gw

whether it was capable of being contemplated. The difference can be seen by
how many cases would have been decided differently under the new standard.
Third, the language "foreseeable" is ambiguous. It means different things
in different legal contexts. And the 1995 legislative intent is beside the point.
What governs are the amendments after 1995. As already noted, where the
legislature amends a statute but leaves language unamended that has been
interpreted by the courts, "the legislature is presumed to have been satisfied with
prior judicial constructions of the unchanged portions of the statute and to have
adopted them as consistent with its own intent." Christensen, 642 P.2d at 756.
Wife's factual positions fare no better. In the opening brief, Husband
showed that, consistent with common sense, the parties placed values on their
assets before dividing them equally. It is difficult to understand how Wife can
deny that the parties placed values on assets, especially when meeting with
former Judge Billings to divide those assets equally. Were Wife correct, the
stipulated decree would divide property arbitrarily. But of course it does not
divide property arbitrarily, precisely because the parties divided their marital
property equally, something they could do only by placing values on assets.
But even if Wife were correct that the parties placed no values on the
properties, this only confirms that the parties did not contemplate Wife's ability
to generate income from the sale of property during the period of alimony, let
alone the sizable income she did later generate. This court should reverse.

3
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Argument

In the response brief, Wife makes numerous legal and factual assertions
that are incorrect. Husband will address each one below.
As an initial matter, Wife asserts that the application of the law to the facts
is beyond the scope of this court's review. [Resp. Br. at 30-31.] But this court
agreed to review the following question: "Whether the court of appeals erred in
its construction and application of Subsection 30-3-5(8)(i)(i) of the Utah Code."
[Order, 12/12/2017 (emphasis added).] The application of law to the facts is
before the court, and it is dispositive under either test.
Wife also contends that Husband "does not acknowledge the rules of
statutory construction." [Resp. Br. at 16.] She asserts that Husband overlooked
the general rule that statutes are to be construed according to their plain
language. [Resp. Br. at 14-16.] But Husband acknowledged that general rule and
demonstrated why it does not govern. First, what the legislature meant by
"foreseeable" is hardly plain. That term employs a <:iifferent balancing of facts
and law in different contexts, e.g., duty and proximate cause. Second, the
legislature is presumed to have adopted courts' construal of statutory language
when the legislature amends a statute but does not disturb the construed
language. The legislature has adopted the traditional test by amending the
statute here many times without expressing any disapproval with the courts'
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application of the traditional test. This leaves Wife's assertions of plain language
beside the point.
1.

MacDonald Erred When It Overruled Dozens of Cases

Wife acknowledges that MacDonald changed the standard, but asserts that
it correctly overruled those cases under the test set forth in State v. Menzies, 889
P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). Wife correctly notes that one panel of the court of appeals
II

may overrule its own or another panel's decision where the decision is clearly
erroneous or conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision
inapplicable." [Resp. Br. at 17 (citing Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 n.3 (internal
quotation marks omitted)).] Wife then asserts that if MacDonald is "inconsistent
with Bolliger or [dozens of] prior panel decisions as a practical matter, it was
permitted to deviate." [Resp. Br. at 17.]
But that discussion in Menzies does not allow the court of appeals to create
an inconsistency in its case law. Utah law is clear that "in accordance with
horizontal stare decisis, the first decision by a court on a particuJar question of
law governs later decisions by the same court." State v. Tenorio, 2007 UT App 92,

,r 9, 156 P.3d 854 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nor does Menzies articulate the current test for overturning precedent. As
this court recently stated, " [o]ur decisions have identified two broad factors that
distinguish between weighty precedents and less weighty ones: (1) the
persuasiveness of the authority and reasoning on which the precedent was
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originally based, and (2) how firmly the precedent has become established in the
law since it was handed down. The second factor encompasses a variety of
considerations, including the age of the precedent, how well it has worked in
practice, its consistency with other legal principles, and the extent to which
people's reliance on the precedent would create injustice or hardship if it were
overturned." Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21,

if 22, 345 P.3d 553. Neither the

court in MacDonald nor Wife attempts to satisfy this test
In particular, Wife does not address whether "more good than harm will
come by departing from precedent." Id.

if 64. This court has explained that it

would consider "whether overturning a precedent would undermine the public's
substantial reliance upon an established legal principle.... [P]eople should know
what their legal rights are as defined by judicial precedent, and having
conducted their affairs in reliance on such rights, ought not to have them swept
away by judicial fiat." Cope v. Utah Valley State College, 2014 UT 53, if 19, 342 P.3d
243 (internal quotation marks omjtted). MacDonald disrupts the expectations of
thousands of parties to divorce proceedings, as well as the courts that presided
over those proceedings, who have drafted divorce decrees under the assumption
that the traditional test applies, just as decades of case law say it does.
Wife has not shown that the court of appeals correctly deviated from its
precedent applying the traditional test, even if stare decisis were the only
consideration in play. But importantly, stare decisis is not the only consideration
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in play because, under the Christensen test, the legislature has adopted the
traditional test as correctly interpreting its statute that governs here. Christensen

v. Indus. Comm'n, 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982).
2.

Fish and Earhart Did Not Change the Law

Inconsistent with Wife's discussion of stare decisis, Wife also contends that

MacDonald "is not the outlier Husband portrays it to be." [Resp. Br. at 17.] As
Wife did in the court of appeals, she cites Fish v. Fish, 2016 UT App 125,379 P.3d
882, and Earhart v. Earhart, 2015 UT App 308, 365 P.3d 719. [Resp. Br. at 17-19.]
Wife does not address Husband's demonstration that neither Fish nor Earhart
overruled the traditional test. [Op. Br. at 27.] The court in MacDonald and Wife
misinterpret Fish and Earhart as departing from the traditional test. They did not.
The court in Fish asked only whether every increase in income (there, $2
per hour) automatically constituted a substantial change in circumstances. 2016
UT App 125, ,r 19. Fish held that the $2 per hour increase was not substantial. Id.
("The magnitude of [the wife's] alleged increase in income is therefore much
smaller than that asserted by [the husband]."). The court correctly noted "an
increase of income not actually contemplated by the divorce decree does not

automatically require a finding that a' substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce' has occurred." Id.
(emphasis added). Every future change need not be expressly set forth in the
decree, because, were the law otherwise, some future changes like ordinary
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raises and, as the court put it, "creeping inflation," would require revisiting
alimony. Id. Neither the traditional test nor the new test require such a result.
Similarly, Earhart neither overruled nor purported to overrule the
traditional test. Earhart uses both terms, "unforeseen" and "unforeseeable." 2015
UT App 308, ilil 1, 3, 11,365 P.3d 719. But it uses the term "unforeseen" in its
holding - a detail the court in MacDonald overlooked. Id.

,r 14. In short, neither

Fish nor Earhart departed from the traditional test.
The consistency of the case law prior to MacDonald is confirmed by

Christensen v. Christensen, a case issued two weeks before MacDonald. 2017 UT
App 120,400 P.3d 1219. That case expressly cited the traditional test: "to succeed
on a petition to modify, the moving party must first show that a substantial
material change of circumstance has occurred since the entry of the decree and
[second, that the change was] not contemplated in the decree itself." Id. ,I 20
(internal quotation marks and bracket omitted).

MacDonald changed the law. But it failed to find that the c~ses applying the
traditional test were clearly erroneous, that conditions had changed, or that the
public has not relied upon the traditional test. This court should reverse.
3.

Stare Decisis Is Beside the Point Because the Legislature Amended the
Statute Many Times Without Disapproving of the Traditional Test
In the opening brief, Husband demonstrated that, under Christensen v.

Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982), the legislature adopted the
traditional test when it reenacted section 30-3-5(8)(i)(i) numerous times without
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disturbing the many cases interpreting that section as reflecting the traditional
test. [Op. Br. at 14-17.] In the words of Christensen, "where a legislature amends a
portion of a statute but leaves other portions unamended, or re-enacts them
without change, the legislature is presumed to have been satisfied with prior
judicial constructions of the unchanged portions of the statute and to have
adopted them as consistent with its own intent." 642 P.2d at 756.
Wife asserts that Christensen does not apply because Utah appellate courts
have never "construed" the statute. [Resp. Br. at 19-20.] Wife asserts that "none
of the post-1995 appellate cases Husband cites as applying the 'contemplated in
the decree itself' standard construed the statutory language." [Resp. Br. at 20.]
Wife contends that, rather than "construing" the statute, the cases either
11

II

summarily cited and proceeded under Bolliger" or summarily cited and

proceeded under standards in certain pre-1995 decisions." [Resp. Br. at 20-21.]
It is difficult to understand how these cases fail to construe the language of
the statute, and then repeatedly apply that construal to the facts of their case.
"Construction" means "[t]he act or process of interpreting or explaining the
meaning of a writing (usu. a constitution, statute, or other legal instrument); the
ascertainment of a document's sense in accordance with established judicial
standards." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The court of appeals construed
the statute as reflecting the traditional test, even when citing Bolliger.
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And the court in Bolliger was clear that the new statute reflects the
traditional test, even though the legislature changed its wording. 2000 UT App
47,

,r 11 & n.3, 997 P.2d 903. The court cited the 1995 statute, acknowledged the

statutory amendment in a footnote, and then devoted the bulk of its analysis to
describing and applying the case law applying the traditional test. Id.

,r,r 11-24.

In fact, rejecting the possibility that "foreseeable" might mean what Wife now
contends, Bolliger quoted a pre-1995 case, saying '"[w]e do not believe it makes
for good law or sound policy to have parties arguing years after the fact over
what a trial court may or may not have considered when making an alimony
award."' Id.

,r 19 (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250,253 (Utah Ct. App.

1993)). The court retained the traditional test that a change be"' contemplated in

the decree itself."' Id.

,r 11 (quoting Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct.

App. 1990)).
The court's construal of statutory language to embody the traditional test
has driven the result in numerous cases. Had ~olliger adopted MacDonald's
construal of "foreseeable," it would have come out differently. In Bolliger, the
trial court found no substantial, material change in circumstances because "[t]he
alleged changes of [the husband]' s retirement and the parties' receipt of social
security benefits are foreseeable events." 2000 UT App 47,

,r 6. The court of

appeals reversed on the ground that retirement and receipt of social security
benefits were not "foreseen." Id.

,r 20. The court stated that "[w]hile it is
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axiomatic that the parties to a divorce decree will experience some type of
economic change after the original divorce decree is entered, the change, if
substantial, will support a modification to the decree only if it was not foreseen at
the time of the divorce decree." Id. (emphasis added). Had the court meant
11

foreseeable," the result would have been different because retirement and social

security are "foreseeable," i.e., capable of being taken into account.
Other cases also would have come out differently under the MacDonald
test. For example, in Young v. Young, the substantial change in circumstances was
the husband's receiving social security benefits - an event "not expressly
foreseen in the original divorce decree." 2009 UT App 3, ,r 3,201 P.3d 301. Under
the MacDonald test, social security benefits are "foreseeable."
Wife also contends that the Christensen analysis fails because the legislature
amended the statute since Fish and Earhart. She states, "The problem is that
Husband cannot point to a consistent 'judicial construction' of the Statute for the
legislature to embrace." [Resp. Br. at 21.] But this is not a problem. Neither Fish
nor Earhart changed the law, and so the steady, repeated application of the
traditional test without legislative disapproval governs.
4.

The 1995 Legislative History Does Not Govern

Wife also discusses the legislative history surrounding the 1995
amendment. For instance, Wife states there was no "benchmark standard" for
alimony modifications and quotes language asserting that trial courts were
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inconsistent statewide. [Resp. Br. at 23-24, quoting House Floor Day 8.] But that
assertion comes from the beginning of the legislature's discussion concerning the
entire amendment. [Id.; compare Resp. Br. at 25, quoting Senate Floor Day 32.] In
other words, the discussion concerning inconsistent decisions was not directed at
petitions to modify alimony. It was directed at the significant changes.

In fact, the petition to modify provision was a minor point. Wife states that

~

Husband "either deliberately misstates, or in his review has missed, the
legislative history" concerning the petition to modify provision. [Resp. Br. at 25.]
Neither is true. Husband pointed out that the legislative history" gives very little
attention to it at all, merely confirming that modifications would still be
allowable after the amendment." [Op. Br. at 22.] The quotation Wife provides
confirms this point. The entire bill, House Bill 36, was the product of a three-year
Task Force, and the amendments to the bill required two conference committees.
The bill was debated on the floor of the House four times and on the floor of the
Senate five times, with nearly two total hours of discussion. 1 Of that time,
Senator Hillyard' s statement regarding foreseeability lasted just over one minute.
The foreseeability language likely received little attention because the
change was not significant. As Husband explained in his opening brief, the pre1995 statute allowed alimony modifications: "The court has continuing

See House Floor Debates on H.B. 36, Revision of Alimony Standards, 1995
Leg., Gen. Sess., available at https:/ /le.utah.gov /asp/audio/index.asp?
House=H; Senate Floor Debates on H.B. 36, Revision of Alimony Standards, 1995
Leg., Gen. Sess., available athttps:/ /le.utah.gov /asp/audio/index.asp?House=5.
1
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jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties ... as is reasonable and necessary." Utah Code § 30-35(3) (1994). And Husband cited a series of cases from the 1970s, 1980s, and early
1990s that applied this statute. [Op. Br. at 20-21 & n.2.]
Interpreting that statute, this court stated in 1972 that" expressed or
assumed facts contemplated by the parties" must nonetheless be "incorporated
in the decree" in order to allow subsequent modification. Felt v. Felt, 493 P.2d
620,624 (Utah 1972). In 1983, this court used the phrase that carried through the
decades: "On a petition for modification of a divorce decree, the threshold
requirement for relief is a showing of substantial change in the circumstances of
the parties occurring since the entry of the decree and not con temp lated in the decree

itself." Lea v. Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).
Those cases governed at the time of the amendment. Senator Hillyard
added the word "foreseeable" because it was common in the child support
context, not to change the test for alimony modification. He did not suggest that
the traditional test was incorrect or that the amendment would change the law,
which is precisely what the court of appeals noted in Bolliger.
It is notable that, in the quotation Wife provides, the only example Senator
Hillyard provides is consistent with the traditional test: "if you projected
alimony may be less, or more, for two years and then reduced, because the
woman should have the occupational training that she's planning on getting,
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then that is clearly foreseeable." [Resp. Br. at 25 (emphasis added).] If the
alimony was "projected," and the recipient "was planning on getting" training,
the petition to modify would fail under the traditional test.
Senator Hillyard explained "the current law on child support" required "a
substantial change in circumstances" and "that it's not foreseeable at the time of
the divorce." [Resp. Br. at 25.] An examination of the case he cites, Dana v. Dana,
789 P.2d 726 (Utah Ct App. 1990), and the state of the law at the time, confirms
that he did not intend to depart from the traditional test.

Dana is a child support case. Id. at 729. The case concerns whether a change
is substantial, not foreseeable, because the change was contemplated in the
decree. There, the wife earned only $3,000 during the marriage, but" at the time
of the divorce decree, the court anticipated [she] would increase her earnings from
$10,000 to $12,000 shortly after the divorce, by finding outside employment." Id.
at 729 (emphasis added). When she earned $17,000 instead, the court of appeals
held that b~cause of the court's "reasonable anticipation of [the wife]'s earnings"
II

of $10,000 to 12,000, the additional income (up to $17,000) was not substantial."

Id. Because the decree anticipated that she would increase her income, the
question of foreseeability was not at issue. Thus, the facts of Dana support
Husband's arguments, not Wife's: "foreseeable" goes to whether the change was
contemplated in the decree. Senator Hillyard did not assert otherwise.
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Dana relied on Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah·Ct. App. 1998).
Fullmer was primarily a custody case. Its alimony analysis is not helpful. And
given that child custody differs so widely from alimony, its custody analysis is
not helpful either. Id. at 946. But to address Wife's brief in full, Husband
responds as follows. 2

In custody matters, changes in circumstances are viable only if the changes
are to circumstances "upon which the previous award was based." Id. at 946
(internal quotation marks omitted). In Fullmer, the father asserted that the court
should reexamine the custody award, which awarded primary custody to the
mother. Id. at 943. The father asserted two substantial changes in circumstances
since the divorce: (1) the mother had begun working full-time, whereas she
previously had worked part-time; and (2) the father had remarried, had another
child, and thereby created a stable home environment. Id. at 945.
The court of appeals held that there had been no change in circumstances
because the original custody decision took both of those facts into account. Id. at
947. The court concluded that the father was

II

aware □

of the circumstances at the

time he voluntarily entered into the stipulation." Id. Specifically, he was aware

MacDonald acknowledges that the "change in circumstances required to
justify a modification of a divorce decree varies with the type of modification
sought." 2017 UT App 136, ,r 9 n.3 (quoting Haslam v~ Haslam, 657 P.2d 757, 758
(Utah 1982)); see also Blocker v. Blocker, 2017 UT App 10, ,r 12, 391 P.3d 1051
(same); Jones v. Jones, 2016 UT App 94, ,r 10, 374 P.3d 45 (same); Busche v. Busche,
2012 UT App 16, ,r 12,272 P.3d 748 (same). Wife does not address whether
MacDonald also overruled those cases.
2
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that (1) there was no economic way for the mother to support herself without
working full-time, so it was "reasonable to assume" that she would do so
immediately; and (2) the father was engaged to his girlfriend, who was already
pregnant with his child, so it was "reasonable to assume" that he was shortly
going to have a new wife and another child. Id. at 947-48. The court determined
that "the alleged change of circumstances relied upon by the trial judge were
within the reasonable contemplation of the respondent at the time he stipulated
to the custody arrangement and thus not legally cognizable." Id. at 947.
Wife states that Dana and Fullmer allow for changes that "may reasonably
be anticipated," the language in MacDonald. [Resp. Br. at 27 (quoting MacDonald,
2017 UT App 136, 111 (quoting dictionary)).] But neither Dana nor Fullmer
stands for that proposition. In both cases, the change was contemplated in the
decree or already occurring and therefore foreseen.
Finally, Wife asserts that Husband's hypotheticals, that "[a] person may
anticipate retirement" or anticipate selling real property," are "squarely at
JI

odds" with Dana and Fullmer. [Resp. Br. at 27.] That is true - but only because
events that are not contemplated in the decree are squarely at odds" with those
JI

that are. Dana and Fullmer both involved changes that were incorporated into the
underlying decree. Prospective retirement or anticipation of a future sale of real
property could be contemplated in the decree, but if they are not, they should
remain eligible for future modification.
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5.

The Richardson Standard Confirms the Traditional Test

Wife also asserts that Richardson v. Richardson, 2008 UT 57, 201 P.3d 942, is
beside the point. [Resp. Br. at 28-30.] But Husband demonstrated that the
combination of Richardson and MacDonald created an unworkable framework.3
In response, Wife asserts that Richardson addresses changes in the decree
and MacDonald addresses changes after the decree. But that is the point. Richardson
and MacDonald are bookends. Richardson governs which prospective changes
may be addressed at the time of the divorce, and MacDonald governs which
changes may be addressed after the divorce. The two need to be compatible, so
parties know what future changes they must account for in the divorce decree.
As described in the opening brief, Richardson states that certain events may
be considered in the initial alimony determination if the event is "certain to occur
within a known time frame." 2008 UT 57, ,r 10. In contrast, if an event is
"uncertain[]," then "prospective changes to alimony are disfavored." Id. This
court distinguished a child's turning 18 from retirement - a child's turning 18 is
an event that is certain to occur at a certain time, but retirement is not. Thus,
prospective changes can be built into, or correctly implied to be in, the divorce
decree where the "date" and "result" are known. But where the "date" and
11

result" are unknown, those changes may support a petition to modify.

To be clear, contrary to Wife's misstatement, Husband did not argue that
MacDonald "disturb[ed] or affect[ed]" Richardson's holding. [Resp. Br. at 29.]
3
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Richardson, issued in 2008, is compatible with decades of case law, before
and after 1995, which allows petitions to modify when a substantial change has
occurred that was "not contemplated in the decree itself." Christensen v.

Christensen, 2017 UT App 120, ,r 20, 400 P.3d 1219 (internal quotation marks
omitted); Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, ,r 11, 157 P.3d 341 (internal quotation
marks omitted); Bayles v. Bayles, 1999 UT App 128, ,r 12, 981 P.2d 403; Lea v.

Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah 1983). This created a predictable system in
which, if the date and significance of a future change are known at the time of
divorce, then it can be taken into account in the decree. Changes that were
contemplated in the decree could not later justify modification.

MacDonald disrupts this balance. As the court articulated in Bolliger v.
Bolliger, the policy implications of that disruption are significant: "We do not
believe it makes for good law or sound policy to have parties arguing years after
the fact over what a trial court may or may not have considered when making an
alimony award." 2000 lff App 47, ,r 19, 997 P.2d 903 (internal quotation ~arks
omitted). This policy remains true, which perhaps explains why the legislature
adopted Bolliger as reflecting the statute.
This court should reverse MacDonald to restore the predictability that
allows parties to make deliberate decisions regarding their divorce decrees and
courts to know what future changes should impact current alimony awards.
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6.

Under Its New Test, the Court of Appeals Should Have Remanded

Even under MacDonald's new characterization of the test, the court of
appeals erred when it did not remand for a factual determination. Having
established "foreseeability" as the test, the court of appeals erred when it
decided, on its own, that the income here was foreseeable. The court assumed
that the question of foreseeability is a question of law. But as argued in the
opening brief, the question of foreseeability, if that is the test, is a question of fact.
At a minimum, MacDonald should have remanded for the trial court to determine
whether Wife's income was foreseeable.
And as explained in the opening brief, the trial court could not have found
that the future income, as opposed to the sale of property, was foreseeable. Recall
that the period of alimony was only a few years. It was not certain that Wife
would sell the property during that period. Had she sold the property towards
the end of the period, the effect would have been minimal. As it was, she sold it
very early in the alimony period and invested the proceeds to generate a
significant stream of income, directly impacting her need for alimony as
anticipated by the parties and the court when setting alimony.
Relatedly, the foreseeability of the price is significant. Had Wife sold the
property for the price the parties placed on the property when dividing the
property equally, she would not have had as much principal to invest. And had
she spent the proceeds, rather than invested them; sh~ would not have earned a
substantial income from them. Had she invested only some of the proceeds, or
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deposited them in an interest bearing account, rather than an investment
account, the income she drew may not have been "substantial," even if it was a
"change in circumstances."
In short, once the question of new income is the focus, the trial court's
ruling cannot support the court of appeals' decision to affirm without remand.
For these reasons, under the new test the court should have remanded for
determination of whether the stream of income was foreseeable.
7.

Under the Traditional Test, the Court of Appeals Should Have
Remanded

Additionally, as demonstrated in the opening brief, had MacDonald
retained the traditional test, it should have reversed and remanded.
Under the traditional test, Wife's ability to sell the land for a windfall and
to begin to generate significant income from the proceeds were not
"contemplated in the decree itself." Wife contends otherwise, pointing to phrases
in the divorce decree suggesting that someday Wife might sell the property.
[Resp~ Br. at 33.]
Husband has not asserted that it was unforeseen that Wife might ever sell
the property at any price. What was unforeseen was that Wife would sell the
property quickly, at a substantial sum, invest the proceeds, and generate
significant income during the period in which the decree contemplated the need
for alimony. Nothing in the divorce decree contemplated those changes in
circumstances. In other words, the idea that Wife might someday sell the
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property at some price is not determinative. Husband agrees that the mere
liquidation of property received in a divorce would not constitute income.
Husband instead contends that Wife's investment of those proceeds and ability
to generate income from those investments do constitute income. Rather than
change the test for petitions to modify, MacDonald should have reversed on the
ground that the substantial change in circumstances that affected income (the
investment) was not contemplated in the divorce decree.
In her response brief, Wife tries to blur the distinction between property
and income. [Resp. Br. at 33-35.] But as Husband explained in his opening brief,
it was not the division of property or sale of the property that was the change in
circumstances. The change in circumstances was the timing of the sale, combined
with the unexpected price, combined with the investment of the proceeds,
combined with the significant income generated. [Op. Br. at 33-36.]
The cases Wife cites do not help her position. Wife cites Felt v. Felt, 493
P.2d 620 (Utah 1972). Wife quotes the following passage: "the wife's equity in the
home and about insurance policies awarded to her in the decree [were] facts
quite impertinent and inadmissible here," id. at 622. But that quote describes the
information that was not "found in the court's written Findings." Id. at 622. The
alleged change in circumstances in Felt was an increase in the wife's wages, a
decrease in the husband's wages, and the husband's remarriage. Id. at 623-24.
And Felt, more than twenty years before the 1995 amendment, stated: "we affirm
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previous pronouncements that a divorce decree containing awards for

support based on either expressed or assumed facts contemplated by the parties
or the court or both, should not be modified when the contemplated facts are
obvious or agreed to by the parties and in tum incorporated in the decree." Id. at
624. Felt supports Husband's argument.
Wife also cites to a Connecticut case from 1995, Denley v. Denley, 661 A.2d
628 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995). But it also does not help Wife. There, the court
awarded to the husband stock options, some of which he liquidated. Id. at 631.
The wife argued that this constituted a substantial change in circumstances
because his income was higher after liquidating assets. Id. at 631. She did not
assert that the husband's income was higher because he began generating income
from investing the stock options. Id. The court held that the "mere exchange of an
asset awarded as property ... for cash ... does not transform the property into
income." Id. This is correct, but beside the point here.
Here, Wife had a change in inqJme because she invested the cash and

began generating annual income from that windfall from the sale of Lot 1. Put
differently, it is not the principal that is at issue, it is the new income generated
from that principal after it was liquidated and invested.
Similarly, Wife's reliance on Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) is misplaced. [Resp. Br. at 34-35 (quoting R.822).] In Jense, the parties
stipulated to the value of the marital home and agreed that the husband would
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_receive the home and the wife would receive cash. 784 P.2d at 1252. The cash
setoff was to be paid after the husband received an anticipated bonus. Id. But
things did not play out as anticipated. The husband did not receive the bonus,
but instead lost his job and sold the house for two-thirds the price the parties
expected. Id. at 1250, 1252. He petitioned to modify the cash set-off, which by that
time had been reduced to a judgment, on the ground that the decline in value of
the real property constituted a change in circumstances. Id. at 1250-51.
The court of appeals refused, explaining that the division represented an
equal "distribution of the marital estate as it existed on the date of the decree." Id.
at 1252. Although the husband's loss of his bonus and job reduced his ability to

pay the judgment, neither changed the value of the marital estate on the day of
divorce. Id. The court of appeals confirmed that changes in property settlements
are strongly disfavored. Id. at 1252-53. Alimony was not at issue.
The trial court here compared Husband to the husband in Jense,
concluding that both had "received exactly what he bargained for." [R.821.] But
unlike the husband in Jense, Husband has not asked the court to change a
property settlement or to vacate a judgment against him. Husband agrees that
Wife is entitled to all of the proceeds from sales of her properties.
Instead, Husband asked the trial court to recognize that a substantial
change in circumstances occurred for purposes of alimony because, as a result of
II

the annual income Wife receives from her new investments, Wife's earning
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. _cap~city or ability to produce income" has changed. (R.257-59;682-697;83640;1259.) Thus, Jense is beside the point.
Moreover, the trial court acknowledged that Wife's income changed: "the
evidence is that the income has changed for [Wife] from the time of the Decree,
where it was at or near zero, to the time of trial where the testimony was that it
was $45,000 or $67,200 a year depending on the source of the testimony. So it has
changed." [R.822-23; see also R.1108:23-1109:1;1115:10-21 (Wife's accountant
testifying her earnings were $45,000 per year).] Wife's financial declaration
indicated she earned $167 from work and $441 from an actor's pension, and
otherwise her income was entirely from investments and alimony. [R.618.]
None of the cases cited by Wife support affirming.
Factual Assertions -In what remains, Husband addresses various factual

assertions in the response brief, which are either incorrect or beside the point.
First, Wife contends that it is impossible to determine whether Wife's
change in income i~ "substantial" because there was no baseline finqing of
"need." [Resp. Br. at 36.] This is incorrect. Wife's need, without investment
income, is set forth in the decree. And the trial court could calculate Wife's need
after generating new income because she filled out a financial declaration in
which she indicated her expenses. [R.619,625.] But the trial court did not
calculate her need because it stopped its analysis at the preliminary step of
whether a change had occurred at all. Wife's "need" and "income" are fact
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.-···· ____ questions appropriate.for review by the t:rial court, once it has been properly
inst:ructed that a change in circumstances exists. Wife also asserts that Husband
may end up having to pay "more" to sustain Wife at her marital standard of
living. [Resp. Br. at 36-37, n.11.] Again, this statement confirms that the question
must be presented to the t:rial court. 4
II

Second, Wife cites to the MacDonald footnote that there was no evidence

Gi@

that the parties agreed to the property distribution based on any mutual
understanding of the value of the parcels involved." [Resp. Br. at 39 (citing

MacDonald, 2017 UT App 136, ,r 19, n.7).] But as stated in the opening brief, "[t]he
statement that there was 'no evidence' flatly cont:radicts the record." [Op. Br. at
40.] Wife asserts that the evidence to which Husband cited was "self-serving."
[Resp. Br. at 39,40.] "Self-serving" means supports the position of an opponent,
hardly a charge that undermines its value, let alone supports the court's
erroneous footnote that there was no evidence. In other words, Wife
acknowledges the evidence, but attempts to minimize its impact by noting that .
the evidence undermines her position. Regardless, there is evidence.
Third, and most important, Wife repeatedly asserts that the t:rial court
11

unequivocally found that the parties did not agree or premise their Agreement

on any mutual understanding as to the value of the real properties, including Lot

Wife also states that Husband was awarded several properties. [Resp. Br. at
37.] That is true, but irrelevant, because those properties were his premarital
separate property, and most had liabilities attached to them. [R.157,162,114-15.]
4
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l." [R.esp. Br. ~t_9~.]

µ,. support, Wife cites a factual finding that "there is not any

provision in the Decree or the Agreement that sets forth what the parties agreed
were the respective values of any of the various properties that were divided."
[Resp. Br. at 38; R.820.] While those numbers are not set forth in the decree itself,
that fact hardly shows that the parties did not assign values to assets when
dividing assets. Unless the parties randomly assigned assets to each party, they
had discussions -in fact, they had extensive negotiations with former Judge
Billings - of how to divide their assets. And for those discussions to contribute
to an agreement as to why the division was equitable, the parties necessarily
assigned values to the marital assets.

It is difficult to understand how Wife and her counsel can maintain that
they participated in negotiations for the division of marital assets with no
understanding of the value of those assets, to which Husband acting pro se
managed to assign values. [R.86.] As explained in the opening brief, the parties'
n~gotiations were based on values for the lots bas~d on appraisals and county
valuations, as well as extensive spreadsheets that both parties saw. [R.114-15,15662,862,867.] Wife cannot argue now she did not understand; she stated in the

stipulation that she "reached agreement ... [and] has consulted with attorneys
and/ or advisors of [her] choosing and has been duly advised." [R.19.]
Further, Wife declared she only wanted to receive property free and clear
without debt or entanglement. [R.187.] As a result, according to Wife, what she
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got in the decree.was~~-tbree pieces of dirt." [R.1077.] She transformed one of the
pieces of dirt into an income-producing investment, and now she is able to meet
some or all of her own needs, precisely the type of change for which alimony
should be modified.
In short, the trial court erred when it confused the value of the lots (a
property division issue) with Wife's ability to meet her own needs (an alimony
-issue). Whether Wife produced income from the investment of the proceeds from
a property sale or from some other unforeseen circumstance, the important factor
is that Wife is now generating an unforeseen income stream that enables her to
meet her needs and reduces her need for alimony. This court should remand for
findings under the proper standard.
Because the trial court erred under the traditional test, the court of appeals
should have clarified that Wife's change in income constituted a substantial
change in circumstance with regard to income, not property division. This court
should clarify the standard and remand for the trial court to apply the standard
to determine whether Wife's new stream of income is a basis to modify alimony
under that standard.
Conclusion

This court should reverse and restore the traditional test for when a
substantial change in circumstance is an eligible basis to modify alimony. Under
the traditional test- or the new test articulated by the court of appeals -this
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_c;ourt shpgld reverse and remand so the trial court Cfil1. determine whether tl).e_
new income here is a basis to modify alimony.
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2018.
ZIMMERMAN BOOHER

/s/ Troy L. Booher
Troy L. Booher
Julie J. Nelson
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